Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws by Bernfeld, Lawrence D.
Cornell Law Review
Volume 55
Issue 1 November 1969 Article 4
Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws
Lawrence D. Bernfeld
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr
Part of the Law Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Cornell Law Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarship@Cornell Law: A Digital Repository. For more information, please
contact jmp8@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Lawrence D. Bernfeld, Class Actions and Federal Securities Laws, 55 Cornell L. Rev. 78 (1969)
Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/clr/vol55/iss1/4
CLASS ACTIONS AND FEDERAL
SECURITIES LAWS
Lawrence D. Bernfeldt
The securities laws make available various remedies to defrauded
purchasers of securities.1 However, an individual investor is often
unaware he has been wronged; if he does know, the cost of bringing
an action may far exceed his recovery.2 Because "a private remedy [is]
essential if enforcement [of the securities laws is] not to be a haphazard
affair,"3 investor impotence frustrates the purpose of the acts.
New rule 23 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure4 makes the
class action an effective remedy for groups of investors with small
claims.5 With the occasional aid of the Securities and Exchange Com-
mission as amicus curiae, at least four circuits have now had an op-
t A.B. 1965, MA. 1966, University of Pittsburgh; J.D. 1969, Columbia University.
1 The Securities Act of 1933 is aimed at preventing fraud in the initial distribution
of securities. Under § 11 of the Act, the issuer of a registered security is civilly liable
for damages if the registration statement is materially misleading or defective. Section 12
speaks to the actual sales process: under § 12(1), a purchaser may rescind or recover
damages from anyone who offers or sells a security in violation of the registration re-
quirements found in § 5 of the Act; § 12(2) gives the same remedies to a purchaser from
one who offers or sells securities by means of a prospectus or oral communication con-
taining a material misstatement or omission. After the initial distribution of a security,
a defrauded investor may seek relief under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Section
10(b) and rule lob-5 make it unlawful to use any deceptive device, including nondis-
closure, in connection with the purchase or sale of any security. No other federal se-
curities anti-fraud provision is as broad as rule lOb-5, and it now generates almost as
much litigation as all other general anti-fraud provisions combined. Green v. Wolf Corp.,
406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977 (1969). A private right of action
also has been inferred in the Investment Company Act of 1940, although no specific pro-
visions for private civil liability appear in the statute. See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d
94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969), which held that although the In-
vestment Company Act makes no specific provision for private civil liability, such liability
may be implied. Id. at 103, citing J.I. Case v. Borak, 377 US. 426 (1964).
2 Comment, Adequate Representation, Notice and the New Class Action Rule:
Effectuating Remedies Provided by the Securities Laws, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 889 (1968).
8 Id. at 890.
4 Fa. R. Cxv. P. 23. The text of the rule appears in the Appendix at 92 infra.
5 Class actions were formerly available to investors under the old rule 23, but were
of the ineffective "spurious" type, binding only those members of the class who were
parties or intervenors before the court. See Notes of Advisory Committee on Rules in 28
U.S.C. Appendix, Rule 23 (Supp. III, 1965-67). Under the new rule 23, judgment
"whether or not favorable" is binding on all members of the class who have not re-
quested exclusion.
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portunity to consider the availability of the class action in securities
litigation and the treatment to be given it.6
I
THE APPLICATION OF RULE 23 IN FEDERAL SECURITIS ACTIONS
A. The Prerequisites of a 23(b)(3) Class Action in Securities Litigation
1. The Class Shall be so Numerous That Joinder of all Members
is Impracticable
In deciding whether joinder is impracticable under 23(a)(1),
courts necessarily pay initial attention to the definition of the class.
Failure to state the exact number in the class, however, does not
preclude the maintenance of the action so long as the group has
sufficient definition not to be considered "amorphous." 7 For example,
in Fischer v. Kletz a class action was allowed where the class was
defined simply as "all individuals who bought Yale securities during
the period when the allegedly false and misleading financial state-
ments were issued and circulated."9 To require any greater exactitude
"would make the maintenance of class actions in large securities-fraud
cases very difficult, if not impossible,"' 0 and would be contrary to the
Advisory Committee's observation that "a fraud perpetrated on nu-
merous persons by use of similar misrepresentations may be an appeal-
ing situation for a class action . . .,,
Because the securities market is so large, it is unlikely that a
class action will fail because the class is so small as to make joinder
eminently reasonable.12 The danger is rather that a class may be so
6 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977
(1969); Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 US. 930 (1969);
Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 594 U.S. 928 (1969); Hohmann
v. Packard Instr. Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968).
7 Zachman v. Erwin, 186 F. Supp. 681, 688 (S.D. Tex. 1959).
8 41 F.R.D. 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
9 Id. at 384.
10 Id.
11 Id., quoting Advisory Committee's Note, 39 F.R.D. 69, 103.
12 The precedents established under the old class action rule are likely to remain
reliable guides to the minimum size of a class suit. There is a little difference between
23(a)(1) in the revised rule and the language in old rule 23 that required a class "so
numerous as to make it impracticable to bring them before the court." Less than 29
members has been held insufficient to render joinder impracticable; 40 has been held to
thus be sufficient. Comment, supra note 2, at 894 n.38.
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large as to be unmanageable, but this does not seem to be a significant
danger. In Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,13 for example, the class al-
legedly numbered 3,750,000; yet a class action was allowed.14 Finally,
no threat of multiplicity of litigation is necessary to satisfy the joinder
requirement. 15
2. There Are Questions of Law or Fact Common to the Class
Rule 23(a)(2) is the foundation of rule 23(b)(3). A common
question of law or fact must be established before the court can
determine whether it predominates over individual questions or
whether the class action device is the superior means of adjudicating
the controversy.
The basic question arising in securities cases litigated under rule
23 has been whether a common fraud was perpetrated on the class.
Where proxy statements containing misrepresentations and material
omissions are mailed to all members of the class of shareholders,"0 or
where all members of the class purchased the securities of a company
that failed to comply with the provisions of the Investaent Company
Act of 1940 by failing to register,17 this condition is easily met.'8
Where fraud is practiced through oral statements, the possibility of
material variation among. the statements makes it unlikely that they
will provide a common question.' 9 However, oral misrepresentations
are often accompanied by failure to disclose material facts, a sin -of
omission that is "necessarily common to all shareholders." 20 Misrep-
1s 891 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968).
14 But see the dissent: "Class actions were not meant to cover situations where al-
most everybody is a potential member of the class." Id. at 571 (Lumbard, CJ., dissenting).
'5 Hohmann v. Packard Instr. Co., 899 F.2d 711, 714 (7th Cir. 1968). Though no
other member of the class had sought to intervene, the Hohmann court stated that
"[e]ven one member of a large class of claimants can provide the kind of representation
which might otherwise be unattainable if each claimant had to act individually'
16 Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 161 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 894 US. 980 (1969).
17 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 US. 928 (1969).
18 For another example see Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60, 63
(S.D.N.Y. 1969).
19 (Oral] . . . misrepresentations . . . might have been similar with respect to
all members of the class, but they were not ... standardized misrepresentations
appearing in a prospectus, financial statements and advertisements and standard-
.ized agreements appearing in written documents.... Although having some com-
mon similarities, these face to face oral misrepresentations are individualized
and susceptible of material variations, particularly in view of the disparities in
the financial condition of each member. Such differences are not ... inherent in
the garden variety of securities class actions.
MoscarelU v. Stamm, 288 F. Supp. 453, 462-68 (E.D.N.Y. 1968) (emphasis added).




resentations made over a period of time "will not preclude a class
action, provided they were made pursuant to a common scheme."
21
Proof of common reliance on the fraud is not an element of proving
that a common question exists.2
2
The court's control over a class action allows it to be lenient in
the application of the common question requirement in the early
stages of an action. For example, in Green v. Wolf Corporation23 a
series of three prospectuses had issued. The prospectuses differed in
detail, but plaintiffs alleged that each contained material misrepre-
sentations and omissions and that the third prospectus exemplified
each defect. Although plaintiffs' proof was directed at the third pro-
spectus, the Second Circuit allowed the action to proceed as one
where the class embraced those who had purchased both before and
after the third prospectus was issued.
3. The Claims or Defenses of the Representative Parties Are
Typical of the Claims or Defenses of the Class
For a claim to be typical of the claims" of the class, the represen-
tatives of the class must have interests not antagonistic to or in con-
flict with those of the absent parties they seek to represent. 24 The
Second Circuit has construed the "typical claim" requirement broadly
in light of the trial court's ability to "make use of the flexibility
available to it and so important to the proper application of Rule
23."25 If in the Green case, for example, conflicts of interest developed
among purchasers under the different prospectuses, the court would
be free to create subclasses under rule 23(c)(4).20
Rule 23(a)(a) does not require that all members of the class be
identically situated if there are substantial questions of law or fact
common to all.27 In the antitrust action brought in Eisen, the "typical
claim" requirement was satisfied despite varying fact patterns because
underlying the individual odd-lot transactions was "the same allegedly
21 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
22 Reliance is an issue lurking behind every lOb-5 action. If reliance had to be
first proved, the concept of class actions under rule lOb-5 would be negated. Herbst v.
Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 16 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). See also Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291,
200-01 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 895 US. 977 (1969); Kronenberg v. Hotel Governor
Clinton, Inc., 41 F.R.D. 42, 45 (SD.N.Y. 1966).
23 406 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 595 U.S. 977 (1969).
24 Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 47 F.R.D. 60 ($.D.N.Y. 1969).
25 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 299 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 895 U.S. 977
1969).
26 See id.




unlawful differential . . . charged to all buyers and sellers."28 But
substantial common questions may exist and the action still would not
be maintainable as a class action. This is the case where the named
plaintiffs are primarily interested in pursuing another claim, such as
a derivative action to prevent a corporate takeover.
29
4. The Representative Parties Will Fairly and Adequately Pro-
tect the Interest of the Class
Rule 23(a)(4) implicitly refers to both the representative parties
and their attorneys when it speaks of adequate protection of the
interests of the class. Under Eisen the essential concomitants of ad-
equate representation are: (1) that the plaintiffs have interests not
antagonistic to those of the remainder of the class; (2) that the likeli-
hood of the litigants being involved in collusive suits is eliminated
to the greatest extent possible; and (3) that the parties' attorneys be
qualified, experienced, and generally able to conduct the litigation.80
It need not be shown that a majority of the class condones the action.5 '
As in Eisen, one litigant may assert the rights of a class. Dismissal out
of hand for "lack of proper representation" in such a case "is too
summary a procedure and cannot be reconciled with the letter and
spirit of the new rule."32
Its power to create subclasses under (c)(4) at any time before the
decision on the merits enables the court to apply the representation
28 391 F.2d at 562. Eisen was an antitrust action and was not brought under the
civil liabilities sections of the federal securities laws. Nonetheless, it deals with the
rights of the small shareholder and is based on the same policy considerations that
affect cases arising under the federal securities statutes.
29 Puharich v. Borders Electronics Co., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc.
L. REP. 92,160, at 96,730 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
30 891 F.2d at 561-63.
81 Hohmann v. Packard Instr. Co., 399 F.2d 711, 713 (7th Cir. 1968), reversed a
finding by the trial judge that adequate representation was not present where less than
30% of a group responded favorably to a court-approved mailing designed to determine
whether plaintiffs could be considered adequate representatives of the class. The letter
appeared in the district court decision and read:
If we succeed, we will THEN ask the Court to invite other purchasers (such
as yourself) to submit their claims for recovery of individual losses and ask the
Court to approve reasonable legal fees, costs and expenses to be paid ONLY out
of the total recovery realized. You assume NO obligation for any PERSONAL
LIABILITY for such expenses, fees and costs of the suits.
43 F.R.D. 192, 195-96 (N.D. Ill. 1967), rev'd, 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968). The addressees
were then asked to fill out a post card which stated: .'I do not approve/disapprove of
your continuing with the suits brought on behalf of the purchasers of Packard Instru-
ment Stock." See also Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968). But
see the dissent. Id. at 571.




requirements liberally. Where, for example, plaintiffs have not pro-
vided information suggesting that there is sufficient identity of in-
terests between distinct groups of stock and bond purchasers, the
class action can nevertheless go forward. The (c)(4) subclass device
enables a class action to be maintained even where there is a pos-
sibility of direct conflict in interest, as where the class consists of
both common stockholders and debenture holders and there are
allegations that defendant corporation "declared and paid common
stock dividends in excess of the limitations set forth in the indenture
under which the debentures were issued and sold to the public."8 3
Practically every class action that can be brought under the securities
statutes by purchasers of securities involves claims by both those who
sold their securities and those who retained them. In Herbst v. Able
this frequently recurring problem was resolved when plaintiffs success-
fully contended that one who had acquired and retained securities
of Douglas Aircraft Corporation could "fairly and adequately" repre-
sent those who purchased the securities and thereafter sold them-and
vice-versa.8 4 The court found that the remedy sought was monetary
damages and that "the only difference between sellers and retainers
may be in their measure of damage."3 5 This latter problem, if and
when it presents a conflict, is subject to resolution at a later time
through the designation of (c)(4) subclasses. 36
The primary question arising out of rule 23(a)(4), however, is
not whether the parties can "fairly and adequately" represent the
interests of the class, but' whether the attorneys for the class can do
so.V The court must be assured that "the representatives [will] put
33 Fischer v. Kletz, 41 F.R.D. 377, 384 (S.D.N.Y. 1966). In this situation, however, the
court did not exercise its prerogative to create subclasses sua sponte, but directed
counsel for the potentially adverse interest to "reconcile any differences and to settle
an order accordingly." Id.
34 47 F.R.D. 11, 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
35 Id.
36 Id.
87 Defendants have shown much gratuitous interest in the welfare of the plaintiff
class. In Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.). 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968), the defendant pointed out
that plaintiffs' counsel had graduated from law school "only seven years ago and is
handling the case by himself. They suggest that he was only retained by these plaintiffs
because he is closely related to them." Id. at 496. This argument was rejected. The court
suggested that defendants who raise such claims may be "underestimat[ing] the ability
of a court to safeguard the interests of all parties." Id., quoting Siegel v. Chicken
Delight, 271 F. Supp. 722, 727 (N.D. Cal. 1967).
The argument that no lawyer-no matter how vast his experience nor how large his
office-could adequately represent the interests of a very large class was rejected:
If this argument were accepted, resort to the class action would be automati-
cally precluded in cases where large numbers of investors had been defrauded
1969]
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up a real fight." 38 Most decisions highlighting 23(a)(4) assume the
qualification of an attorney who is a member of the bar unless the
contrary is proven. Regardless of this assumption's merit,8 9 effort at
least seems guaranteed; the lawyer's compensation is a proportion of
the total award to the class.
40
5. There Are Questions of Law or Fact Which Are Common
That Also Predominate Over Questions Affecting Individual
Members of the Class
41
A class action may be maintained even though the common
questions are not dispositive of the litigation with respect to all
members of the class.42 Although misrepresentation and reliance are
both essential to most securities-fraud actions,43 class actions have
been allowed where the only common question had to do with mis-
representation." In Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company,45 for
through complex schemes and the perpetrators of such schemes would be
assured of virtual immunity from many of the penalities provided by the securities
laws-a patently absurd result.
43 F.R.D. at 496-97.
38 Z. CEUFEE, SOME PROBLEMS OF EQurry 281 (1950).
39 In search of an objective standard by which adequate representation could be
given independent meaning, one commentator suggests the use of "the ability of the at-
torney to spend a sufficient amount of time and money to discover all the necessary facts,
to line up expert witnesses and to handle the other demands imposed by the proper
conduct of complex litigation." Comment, supra note 2, at 904.
40 "Mhe amount of possible recovery by the class rather than by the individual
plaintiffs furnishes the motivating force behind prosecution." Dolgow v. Anderson,
48 F.R.D. 472, 494 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
41 It should be noted that rule 23(b)(3)(A)-(D) enumerates 4 basic considerations,
which are not, however, exclusive, pertinent to a determination of both the predomina-
tion of the common question in the case and the superiority of the class action device.
These are: (1) the interest of the members of the class in individually controlling the
action; (2) the extent and nature of any related litigation already commenced and in-
volving the class; (3) the desirability of concentrating the litigation in the particular
forum; and (4) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
42 Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 100 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928
(1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 48 F.R.D. 472, 490 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
43 Reliance need not be shown where no volitional act by the plaintiff is required
as in non-disclosure cases and situations such as short-form mergers where shareholder
approval is not required. See Mader v. Armel, 402 F.2d 158, 162 (6th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 394 U.S. 980 (1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 489 (E.D.N.Y. 1968);
Comment, Spurious Class Actions Based Upon Securities Frauds Under the Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure, 35 Foanswsx L. Rxv. 295, 300 (1966).
44 Green v. Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 800 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 895 U.S. 977
(1969); Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 99 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 894 U.S. 928
(1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 48 F.R.D. 472, 488 (E.D.N.Y. 1968); A. BROMBEM, SEcu-
Rrrms LAw FAu"--S.E.C. RuLE lOb-5 § 11.6, at 257 (1969).
45 47 F.R.D. 60, 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
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example, the court concluded that common questions involving the
facts of exploration, the press release, and the standard of recovery
in a rule lOb-5 action for damages predominated over the issue of
reliance. Once the common elements have been adjudicated, the
court may order separate trials on the issue of reliance.
46
6. The Class Action Device Must be Superior to Other Avail-
able Methods for the Fair and Efficient Adjudication of the
Controversy
The class action is not the only procedural mechanism available
for disposition of claims involving multiple parties.47 In securities
actions involving large numbers of plaintiffs, however, the superiority
of the class action is usually apparent.48 The court benefits since basic
allegations need be resolved only once.49 More important, however,
is that the class action makes possible suits that would otherwise not
be brought. Other available procedures presuppose "A group of
economically powerful parties who are obviously able and willing to
take care of their own interests individually."6 0 But securities frauds
frequently produce a great number of injuries, collectively serious,
none of which by itself makes an action worthwhile.6' As the Eisen
court found in a different context, dismissal of a securities class action
in many cases will "for all practical purposes terminate the litiga-
tion.16 2 Arguably, this is in itself an insufficient reason for allowing
a class action,53 but the dependence of the securities laws on private
enforcement for their effectiveness suggests that "any error, if there
is to be one, should be committed in favor of allowing the class
action."54
46 Id.
47 The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure specifically provide for joinder of claims
and remedies (rule 18); joinder of persons needed for just adjudication (rule 19); per-
missive joinder of parties (rule 20); misjoinder and non-joinder of parties (rule 21);
interpleader (rule 22); intervention (rule 24); and substitution of parties (rule 25).
48 "[T]he relevant question to consider in deciding if a class action is superior to
other procedures is the number injured by the alleged violation of 10b-5." Green v.
Wolf Corp., 406 F.2d 291, 301 (2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 US. 977 (1969) (emphasis
added).
49 See Esplin v. Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94, 101 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 US. 928
(1969).
50 Id., quoting Frankel, Amended Rule 23 from a Judge's Point of View, 32 Arr-
aRusr L.J. 295, 298 (1966).
51 See 406 F.2d at 301; Hohmann v. Packard Instr. Co., 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968).
52 Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555, 566 n.16 (2d Cir. 1968).
53 Id. at 571 (dissenting opinion).





Rule 23(c)(2) requires "the best notice practicable under the
circumstances"'5 5 to all members of the class.56 Once adequate notice
is given, potential plaintiffs are relieved of the burden of coming
forward and silence is made binding on the non-partiesY
In a large class action notice may present a formidable problem. 58
Numerous transfers of common stock make it extremely difficult to
locate the purchasers, and some holders are impossible to identify
because they have purchased "in street name," leaving their certifi-
cates nameless on the brokers' shelves. Courts have concluded that
published notice is the best notice practicable under the circum-
stances. 59 Although the Supreme Court has not spoken on whether
notice by publication satisfies the standards of due process, it has,
according to Judge Weinstein, indicated that "adequacy of [the
resulting] representation, not the form of notice, is the crucial con-
sideration."60 At any rate, Judge Weinstein continues, the adoption
of the rule is itself a prima facie judgment that procedures consonant
with it are constitutional.( It should be noted that publication is
55 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2).
56 The rule demands that individual notice be given all members of the class who
can be identified "through reasonable effort." Id. In Weiss v. Tenney Corp., [1967-1969
Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 92,414 (S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1969), the court
interpreted "reasonable effort":
Tenney's stock transfer records should contain the identity of each person who
is a member of each class. Thus, the Court hereby directs that individual notice
be sent to each such member....
... Plaintiff shall submit such proposed form of notice and listing [of all
members of each class by name and address] to the Court for approval ....
Id. at 97,966.
57 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 497 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
58 See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), which argues that
it is impossible to give adequate notice to a class consisting of 3,750,000 odd-lot pur-
chasers.
[A] substantial proportion of [the class] ... will have no idea whatever that
they belong to it. Just how a notice can be worded which could alert so large a
"class" to the possibility that proceedings in the Sonthern [sic] District, if carried
forward, would someday enrich each one by a few dollars, if there be anything
left after expenses and attorney's fees, is a mystery to me.
Indeed, the question of how to give any notice which would be sufficient to
meet constitutional requirements is so impossible of solution that my colleagues
choose to ignore it.
Id. at 570 (dissenting opinion).
59 Herbst v. Able, 47 F.R.D. 11, 21 (S.D.N.Y. 1969); Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D.
472, 500 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
60 43 F.R.D. at 500. See Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32, 42 (1940).
61 43 F.R.D. at 500.
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perhaps more likely to achieve notice in a securities action than in
most cases, since the financial community is a cohesive one with a
specialized press.
02
The rule does not specify who shall provide the notice, but
rather provides that notice shall be given "as the court directs." A
court may decline a plaintiff's offer to provide notice.63 In Dolgow v.
Anderson Judge Weinstein found three bases for requiring the de-
fendant, Monsanto Corporation, to provide the required notice: (1)
the fiduciary obligations of the corporation; (2) the interest of defen-
dant in a res judicata decree; and (3) the corporation's ability to
bear the expense of notice. 4 Where plaintiffs are willing and able
to publish notice, but have limited financial means, the rule allows
for flexibility. In Herbst v. Able, for example, five separate class
actions were brought against the same corporate defendant. The
court found that the definitions of the five classes were similar and
allowed the groups of moving plaintiffs to share in the cost of "three
published notices applicable to all five of these actions."015 Further-
more, even though plaintiffs may initially be directed to bear the
cost of giving notice, in certain circumstances defendant may ulti-
mately be required to pay this expense. 6
2. Intervention and Consolidation
Under the provisions of (c)(2)(C), "any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through
counsel." 67 This right to intervene is of considerable practical im-
portance. Although no single plaintiff's appearance is likely to have
any significant effect on the outcome of a class action, intervention
gives the intervenor's attorney an opportunity to become the lead
attorney in the action and therefore a candidate for the largest portion
of the contingent fee.
62 Id. at 501.
63 Id. at 498.
64 Id. at 498-99. One commentator feels that the Dolgow court:
hinted strongly that all three of the factors cited in support of its holding must
be present in order to require notice by the defendant and that such notice
could be required only when a prima fade case of breach of fiduciary duty is
established.
Note, Class Actions Under Federal Rule 23(bX3)-The Notice Requirement, 29 MARY-
LAND L. Ray. 139, 155 (1969).
65 47 F.R.D. at 21. The court observed that if plaintiffs were required to bear
"expense at this juncture which would exceed their losses, it is 'obvious that many share-
holders would be foreclosed a remedy." Id.
66 Id. at 22.
67 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(C.
1969]
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Intervention is also possible, within the court's discretion, under
(d)(2). In one sense (d)(2) affords a greater opportunity to intervene
than does (c)(2)(C) since it is not conditioned on failure to request
exclusion; it may therefore be useful to one who fears that a drawn-
out class action will damage the market value of his stock beyond
the amount recoverable and wants the action dismissed. 8 No case
has yet arisen, however, in which a party requested exclusion from a
(b)(3) action in accordance with the provisions of (c)(2)(A) and at
the same time sought to intervene under (d)(2).89
Possibly the right or opportunity to intervene may be cut off
by an order consolidating several actions. Such an order may issue
either under rule 23(d)(1), which authorizes the court to take steps
to avoid repetition or complication in the presentation of evidence
or argument, or under rule 42. In Fields v. Wolfson7° the court
ordered the consolidation of three separate class actions and made
the following observation:
[Gjonsolidation would result in limiting the legal representation of
the plaintiffs in the consolidated action to the three firms presently
representing their respective parties-plaintiff.
71
The clear inference to be made from this statement is that, following
notice, attorneys for intervenors would not be able to serve the class
or receive a portion of the contingent fee.
72
3. Conditions
The conditional order is a mechanism which allows a class action
to go forward subject to alteration or amendment as contemplated
by rule 23(c)(1) if it later becomes clear that the common questions
do not predominate.73 Furthermore, rule 23(d)(3) authorizes the court
to make appropriate orders "imposing conditions on the represen-
tative parties or on intervenors." One such condition might be consent
68 The only situation where the court might dismiss the action following such an
intervention is one where the class is composed entirely of people who have continued
to hold the stock and will commonly benefit from the wisdom of a rapid dismissal.
69 Even if such a request failed, intervention might still be possible under rule
24(b), since the main action has "a question of law or fact in common" with the
applicant's claim.
70 41 F.R.D. 329 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
71 Id. at 330.
72 Id. However, the court declined to appoint a general counsel for plaintiffs as
defendant requested. Considering the experience of the 3 firms involved, the court
believed that they might "be expected to coordinate the conduct of the proceedings in
a manner that will avoid unnecessary duplication." Id.
73 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 502-03 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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to a pre-trial hearing to discover the likelihood of the moving plain-
tiff's success at trial.7 This technique was used in Dolgow v. Ander-
son.7 5 In Mersay v. First Republic Corporation,78 which was followed
in 'Cannon v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Company,7 however, it was held
that such a condition would "deprive the plaintiff and the class of
the right to a jury trial . . . [and] turn rule 23 into a cumbersome
procedure."78
4. Dismissal and Compromise
Rule 23(e) requires court approval of dismissal or compromise.7 9
Once it has been determined that the class action shall be main-
tained ° no agreement between the parties is binding upon the class
unless the court has indicated its approval. A California district court
recently noted that the "absence or silence of investors does not
relieve the judge of his duty and, in fact, adds to his responsibility."8'
All members of the class must be given notice of the proposed dis-
missal or compromise "in such a manner as the court directs."
8 2
In Cherner v. Transitron Electronic Corporation,83 Judge Wyzan-
ski noted the conditions under which compromise is appropriate.
He stated that the court's task is to determine:
(1) whether the amount proposed to be paid by defendants bears
a reasonable relation to the amount which might be recovered, dis-
counted by the difficulties of proof, by the available total and
partial defenses, and by the uncertainties and delays of trial,
(2) whether the formula for distributing any amount paid by defen-
dants is fair, and
(3) whether in the proposed agreement there are any inequitable
provisions.8'
Of course, it is basic to the nature of settlement that no party will be
fully satisfied. Based upon its knowledge of the case at hand, the
74 This would entail combining the 23(b)(3) order with the rule 16 order as pro.
vided in 23(d).
75 43 F.R.D. 472, 501 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
76 43 F.R.D. 465 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
77 47 F.R.D. 60, 65-66 (S.D.N.Y. 1969).
78 43 F.R.D. at 469.
79 The rule does not specify the time when the approval of the court is first re-
quired. It would appear that the court can do nothing in the pre-trial stage if a de-
fendant corporation attempts to "buy off" the parties-plaintiff.
80 FED. R. Cxv. P. 23(c)(1).
81 Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 32 (N.D. Cal. 1968).
82 FEn. R. Civ. P. 23(e).
83 221 F. Supp. 48 (D. Mass. 1963).
84 Id. at 52.
19691
CORNELL LAW REVIEW
Southern District of New York District Court found that a settle-
ment amounting to less than ten percent of the claim of the stock-
holders constituting a class was a fair one.85 Furthermore, courts are
reluctant to allow a class action to proceed where it is unlikely that
anyone except the lawyers will benefit.8 6
A proposed settlement is presented to the court in terms of the
gross consideration to the class; attorneys' fees are left to the deter-
mination of the court.8 7 Considering the contingent nature of the
fee, hours spent on the case are less important in calculating a fee
than are "the amount of recovery, the contribution of counsel to
that recovery, the skill of counsel and his awareness of responsibilities
to the court-in the conduct of the litigation."88 Nonetheless, counsel
should keep accurate time records, for time spent will be used as a
check on the award of a fee.89
II
THE ROLE OF THE SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE
COMMISSION IN CLASS ACTIONS
Amicus curiae participation by the SEC in class actions is less
frequent than in other areas because the problems are largely those
of interpreting the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure rather than the
securities laws.9 0 The filing of briefs by the Commission in class actions
is a minor part of its overall activities and, at least in percentage terms,
85 Mersay v. First Republic Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L. REP.
92,804, at 97,443 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
86 For example, in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 391 F.2d 555 (2d Cir. 1968), no
member of the alleged 3,750,000-member class stepped forward as a second representative
despite articles about the action in the New York Times and Wall Street Journal. Chief
Judge Lumbard would have dismissed under rule 28(e). Id. at 570-71 (dissenting opinion).
87 Norman v. McKee, 290 F. Supp. 29, 86 (N.). Cal. 1968).
88 Fox v. Glickman Corp., 253 F. Supp. 1005, 1015 (S.D.N.Y. 1966), where the court
approved a total of $285,000 or 16% of the settlement figure as appropriate attorneys'
fees. In Mersay v. First Republic Corp., [1967-1969 Transfer Binder] CCH FED. SEc. L.
REP'. 92,304 (S.D.N.Y. 1968), an attorney's fee was knocked down to $2,000 from an
application of $10,000 because:
[t]he affidavit submitted in conjunction with this latter application indicates how
small the contribution was in the prosecution and settlement of the matter..
Furthermore, the affidavit does not adequately reflect the time spent by mem-
bers and associates of the firm and the nature of the services rendered.
Id. at 97,444.
89 253 F. Supp. at 1015, quoting In re Hudson & Manhattan R.R., 389 F.2d 114 (2d
Cir. 1964).
90 Phone Interview with Phillip Loomis, Jr., General Counsel, SEC, April 21, 1969.
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is not on the increase.91 One reason for the Commission's statistically
small role, however, may be its success where it has served as amicus
curiae: briefs were filed in Hohmann v. Packard Instrument Com-
pany92 and Dolgow v. Anderson,93 and in each case the decision
reached "was consistent with the views expressed by the Commission."94
Two factors influence the SEC's decision whether to participate
as amicus curiae. The first is the clarity of the facts in the particular
case; as a practical matter, the Commission does not wish to become
involved in gathering evidence or examining witnesses.9 The second
is the level of the case in the judicial hierarchy. An invitation from
the court is necessary to participate at the district court level, but
no permission is needed at the. appellate level.9 6
Intrusion by the SEC on plaintiffs' behalf is naturally resented
by defendants.9? Indeed, the entire notion of the Commission's amicus
curiae participation in any private shareholder litigation has been
challenged. It is argued that the SEC has no authority other than
that specifically conferred upon it by Congress and that there is no
such specific grant. Furthermore, it is urged that it is improper for
a federal agency supported by general tax funds to lend its prestige
to plaintiffs in private litigation. 98
Considering the nature of the securities acts and the limitations
of the Commission, however, the Commission's amicus curiae role
in class actions-which clearly reflects "a fundamental policy sym-
pathetic to the class action"99-- is justified. The civil liabilities imposed
by the securities acts are not solely, if at all, compensatory; to a large
extent they are in terrorem. The aim is "to guarantee that the risk
of their invocation will be effective in assuring that the 'truth about
91 Id.
92 399 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1968).
93 43 F.R.D. 472 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
94 34 S.E.C. ANN. REP. 104 (1968).
95 Phone Interview, supra note 90.
96 Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure eliminates the consent
requirement in the case of a government officer or agency.
97 Defendants who argue that class actions are "not any legitimate concern of the
commission," however, are likely to encounter judicial responses similar to Judge
Dimock's in Brown v. Bullock, 294 F.2d 415 (2d Cir. 1961), who, after serving as patient
listener to defense counsel's argument, "leaned forward and asked: 'What's the matter,
counsel? Are you afraid the commission is going to muddy the waters with a little
law?" Loomis & Eisenberg, The SEC as Amicus Curiae in Shareholder Litigation-A
Reply, 52 A.BAJ. 749, 753 (1966).
98 Shipley, The SEC's Amicus Curiae Aid to Plaintiffs in Mutual Fund Litigation,
52 A.B.A.J. 337, 340 (1966).
99 Dolgow v. Anderson, 43 F.R.D. 472, 482 (E.D.N.Y. 1968).
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securities' will be told."100 This goal will be achieved only if there is
truly a threat that an action will be brought; yet in many cases a gen-
eral scheme to defraud the public produces individual injuries too
small to merit an action.101 The answer cannot be total reliance on the
SEC, as budgetary limitations make it impossible for it to investigate
or pursue every possible violation. 0 2 Class actions are one means of
rendering the securities laws more effective, and to this end the Com-
mission properly urges that
courts should employ the full measure of the discretion granted by
the Rule, whenever a fair reading of the complaint permits, to
define classes of injured investors in a manner which will permit
utilization of the class action procedure. 103
APPENDIX
RuLE 23, FEDERAL Ru.Es OF CML PROCEDURE
Class Actions
(a) Prerequisites to a Class Action. One or more members of a class may
sue or be sued as representative parties on behalf of all only if (1) the class
is so numerous that joinder of all members is impracticable, (2) there are
questions of law or fact common to the class, (3) the claims or defenses of
the representative parties are typical of the claims or defenses of the class,
and (4) the representative parties will fairly and adequately protect the
interests of the class.
(b) Class Actions Maintainable. An action may be maintained as a class
action if the prerequisites of subdivision (a) are satisfied, and in addition:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual mem-
bers of the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual
members of the class which would establish incompatible standards of con-
duct for the party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class
which would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the
other members not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or
impede their ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunc-
tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the
100 Id. at 487, citing Douglas & Gates, The Federal Securities Act of 1933, 43 YALE
L.J. 171, 173 (1934).
101 Phone Interview, supra note 90.
102 43 F-R.D. at 483.
103 Id. at 492, quoting SEC Brief.
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members of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individ-
ual members, and that a class action is superior to other available methods
for the fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters per-
tinent to the findings include: (A) the interest of members of the class in
individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions; (B)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class; (C) the desirability or un-
desirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular
forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a
class action.
(c) Determination by Order Whether Class Action to be Maintained;
Notice; Judgment; Actions Conducted Partially as Class Actions.
(1) As soon as practicable after the commencement of an action brought
as a class action, the court shall determine by order whether it is to be so
maintained. An order under this subdivision may be conditional, and may
be altered or amended before the decision on the merits.
(2) In any class action maintained under subdivision (b)(3), the court
shall direct to the members of the class the best notice practicable under the
circumstances, including individual notice to all members who can be
identified through reasonable effort. The notice shall advise each member
that (A) the court will exclude him from the class if he so requests by a
specified date; (B) the judgment, whether favorable or not, will include all
members who do not request exclusion; and (C) any member who does not
request exclusion may, if he desires, enter an appearance through his
counsel.
(3) The judgment in an action maintained as a class action under sub-
division (b)(1) or (b)(2), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include
and describe those whom the court finds to be members of the class. The
judgment in an action maintained as a class action under subdivision (b)
(3), whether or not favorable to the class, shall include and specify or
describe those to whom the notice provided in subdivision (c)(2) was
directed, and who have not requested exclusion, and whom the court finds
to be members of the class.
(4) When appropriate (A) an action may be brought or maintained as
a class action with respect to particular issues, or (B) a class may be divided
into subclasses and each subclass treated as a class, and the provisions of this
rule shall then be construed and applied accordingly.
(d) Orders in Conduct of Actions. In the conduct of actions to which
this rule applies, the court may make appropriate orders: (1) determining the
course of proceedings or prescribing measures to prevent undue repeti-
tion or complication in the presentation of evidence or argument; (2) re-
quiring, for the protection of the members of the class or otherwise for the
fair conduct of the action, that notice be given in such manner as the court
may direct to some or all of the members of any step in the action, or of the
proposed extent of the judgment, or of the opportunity of members to
signify whether they consider the representation fair and adequate, to inter-
vene and present claims for defenses, or otherwise to come into the action;
(3) imposing conditions on the representative parties or on intervenors; (4)
requiring that the pleadings be amended to eliminate therefrom allegations
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as to representation of absent persons, and that the action proceed accord-
ingly; (5) dealing with similar procedural matters. The orders may be com-
bined with an order under Rule 16, and may be altered or amended as may
be desirable from time to time.
(e) Dismissal or Compromise. A class action shall not be dismissed or
compromised without the approval of the court, and notice of the proposed
dismissal or compromise shall be given to all members of the class in such
manner as the court directs.
